What does North Korea want?

Every nation has a unique set of economic and political needs. This set of needs are based on physical factors such as geography, the availability of natural resources and the number of people who live in that nation. It is also based on cultural factors such as the ethnic groups who make up the nation, their religion; financial factors such as the overall wealth of the nation and the distribution of wealth; and historical factors such as its external relations and internal tumult.

When I say this, it means that it’s hard to track every rivulet of influence that becomes the river of national policy. However, it is clear over several generations what that national policy becomes. For example, France requires security on its borders with Germany and access to the rest of the world for its trade. From the time of Louis XIV to Charles de Gaulle, this meant military strength on land and a navy big enough to protect its lines of communications. The formula changed after World War II; security with Germany was gained by integrating the German and French economies. Mexico requires an outlet for its surplus population to work in the United States and security against instabilities in Central America.

This leads us to the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, the North, and a most unnatural state. Both Koreas would agree that the peninsula should never have been divided, but it was. They also agree that external forces divided Korea and that external forces have an interest in keeping Korea divided. (Whether or not their neighbors agree with this assessment is another matter of discussion). However, North Korea has existed for 60 years now; the ties of immediate kinship between Koreans has been sundered; and the widely disparate nature of the North and South’s history, economics, and politics make a reunification of North Korea highly unlikely.

Under the leadership of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, North Korea has expressed the following goals:

• Removal of American military protection from South Korea.

• Unification with South Korea under the North Korean economic and political system, by force if necessary.

• Economic concessions from Japan as compensation for Japanese imperial rule of Korea from 1905 to 1945.

There is a fourth unexpressed goal: national survival as a Stalinist state.

The existence of nuclear weapons by the North does not change these stated goals. However, it does not make them more attainable, either.

North Korea‘s inability to feed its own population has been attested to by the United Nations Food Program and various aid agencies. In addition, North Korea has problems obtaining petroleum and oil to run its industries. To buy food, North Korea must be able to trade what it makes to the rest of the world. However, the state of Northern industries is such that North Korea cannot make manufactured products the rest of the world wants to buy, compared to China, “the world’s factory floor.” What North Korea can offer is weapons expertise and a willingness to ignore international law. North Korea has sold reactor technology to Syria, which Israel then bombed into uselessness. North Korea has missile technology that is functional enough to be used by Iran and states that desire an cheap offensive capability.

North Korea can also blackmail its neighbors into providing food and economic aid. Much of the negotiations since the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreement have been attempts to use incentives such as food and fuel guarantees to prevent the North from developing nuclear weapons. As long as the North was not close to the goal of a working atomic bomb, it played along with its neighbors in the Six Powers (Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States). However, once the North tested a successful bomb design, as they did in May 2009, then these incentives lost their value. The North can obtain fuel and food in exchange for nuclear and missile technology from other states.

However, to do so, it must use the sea. Airplanes are relatively expensive, especially for heavy nuclear equipment. Ships are not. North Korea already has a merchant marine – the United States helped a North Korean crew defeat Somali pirates in 2008 – and a navy to protect that merchant marine. Unfortunately for the North, the other five interested powers have navies that are much bigger. Even if China and Russia did not want to fight North Korea, “quarantine” could be set up by the other three states as long as China and Russia did not interfere.

Hence, North Korea threatened on May 27, 2009 to throw away the armistice of 1953 if the U.S., Japan, or South Korea interfered with the passage of its ships to the open sea.

Is the Obama Administration ready to respond to this challenge in a meaningful manner? Could the Bush Administration have made an effective response to this challenge? Yes, because it is not in the interests of China or Russia or Japan to allow a nuclear-armed North Korea to sell nuclear materials and weapons to third parties. If the national interests of the nations remain the same, then why should it make a difference if John McCain or Barack Obama sat in the White House?

This is where we must travel upstream and break down the river of national policy into its rivulets of influences. President Barack Obama is well-rooted in the liberal ideology that distrusts military influence on national policy, and is indisposed to intervene militarily. He does not have prior experience in foreign policy. He believes that personal influence will overcome long-standing national policies and rivalries. In this case, military intervention against North Korean arms production is too late and might trigger a second Korean War, killing millions. Prior experience in foreign policy is nice, but every day Obama is in office he gains experience-- if he is willing to listen to influences. The foreign policy weakness of his Secretary of State does not help in this matter, though the influence of General Jones as National Security Advisor provides some balance. But what personal leverage does Barack Obama have on Kim Jong-Il, whom he has never met and who has been taught to despise Americans from his birth? Even if Obama could charm Kim Jong-Il into less hostility, isn’t there a North Korean military and political establishment that would also need to be charmed?

Kim Jong-Il is an ill man. He is trying to establish which of his sons will become Korea’s next hereditary Leader. If Kim Jong-Il dies before this, or if he picks a weak or hesitant son, then the North will undergo a leadership crisis. The personal diplomacy of Barack Obama will be undone.

It would be better for the United States and North Korea both if Barack Obama realizes there are times to throw away the charm and to throw down the gauntlet.

Comments

[C Brackett]

I wish that more Americans had the clarity of thought and historical perspective that you have, Greg. I can't wait to see what you think about the president's Cairo speech!

[online writing]

i agree with C Brackett :) there should be more americans that had clarity of thought and historical perspective!